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In this contribution to the symposium on “Corporate Capitalism and
the City of God,” we bring Adolf Berle’s distinctive views of morality in
corporate life into contemporary conversations about corporate religion.
Today’s debates over corporate religious exemptions tend to gravitate
toward an entity view of conscience focused on the moral integrity of
institutions or an associational view keyed to shareholders’ deep
commitments. The foremost corporate law scholar of his day, Berle
instead conceived of corporate conscience as a “public consensus” guiding
and bounding managerial decision-making. Although he would have
sympathized with efforts to integrate faith and business, he would have
rejected the conclusion that faith at work requires religious exemptions for
corporations. Berle instead would structure analysis around corporate
power and its potential to threaten individual personality. His corporate
conscience, we argue, offers fresh insights to debates in corporate law,
constitutional law, and beyond.
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Our ancestors feared that corporations had no
conscience. We are treated to the colder, more modern
fear that, perhaps, they do.
—Adolf Berle†
INTRODUCTION
Few lawyers were as provocative and influential as Professor Adolf
Berle.1 For much of the twentieth century, Berle was in the thick of raging
debates about the purpose of corporations, which constituencies they
should serve, and their broader role in society. These questions now
capture the attention of a new generation on terms largely familiar to Berle.
What is novel, however, is the context: for-profit businesses claiming
religious exemptions from general laws. A growing “faith at work
movement” counsels corporate managers not to leave their religious
beliefs at the office door.2 Meanwhile, notions of corporate conscience
have played a role in transforming the law of religious liberty. In 1968, the
Supreme Court regarded a business’s claim for religious exemption as
“patently frivolous.”3 In the intervening decades, courts rejected the rare
request of a for-profit business to be exempt from law for religious
reasons.4 But in 2014, for the first time, the Court held that for-profit
corporations can claim religious exemptions from general laws.5 Since
then, demands to throw off the constraints of state and federal law to
preserve corporate conscience have proliferated.
What would Berle have made of the twenty-first-century corporate
conscience? In this Article for the symposium on Berle’s “Corporate
Capitalism and the City of God,” we explore Berle’s corporate
conscience—both in its historical context and as applied to today’s
controversies. In doing so, we find that Berle’s view of corporate
conscience is incongruent—perhaps even radically so—from the leading
views currently on offer.

†

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 184 (1954).
1. Henry G. Manne, Berle: The American Economic Republic, 62 MICH. L. REV. 547, 547 (1964).
2. See, e.g., LAKE LAMBERT III, SPIRITUALITY, INC.: RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
51–52 (2009); DAVID W. MILLER, GOD AT WORK: THE HISTORY AND PROMISE OF THE FAITH AT
WORK MOVEMENT 3–8 (2007); HELEN J. ALFORD & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH
MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 1–3 (2001).
3. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 403 n.5 (1968).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
5. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 718 (2014).

2021]

Corporate Conscience

99

Part I marshals evidence, primarily drawn from his “City of God”
chapter, that Berle would have been initially sympathetic to today’s claims
of corporate conscience. He would have welcomed the idea of integrating
religious faith and corporate management. From his point of view,
corporate managers needed to look beyond the financial bottom line and
to consider the “ancient problem of the ‘good life.’”6 Berle advanced the
idea of the corporation as “conscience-carrier of the twentieth-century
American society.”7 This call for moral leadership in business seems in
accord with visions of the conscientious corporation today.
Part II puts this initial evidence to the test by elaborating on Berle’s
conception of corporate conscience and comparing it with the two
conceptions commonly employed by contemporary proponents. For Berle,
a conscientious corporation was one that tracked the value system of the
community—or to use his favored term, the “public consensus.”8 By
contrast, current debates either construct an institutional conscience
around the mission of a particular corporation or draw conscientious
commitments from individuals within the firm. And so, Berle would have
parted ways with contemporary proponents of corporate conscience at the
conceptual level. While an associational view of the corporation would
have held some appeal, shareholders could not serve as the font of
corporate morality in Berle’s view. Above all, his conception of corporate
conscience foregrounded the interests of the community rather than the
interests of private individuals.
Part III argues that while the ideal of religious managers in the Csuite would have held some attraction, Berle nonetheless would have
rejected expansive claims for corporate religious exemptions. Claims to
corporate religious exemption cast the state as the villain and assert a need
for corporate autonomy from democratic reach. By contrast, in Berle’s
political economy, corporate power was a threat to the democratic state
and to vulnerable members of society, including employees, customers,
and the communities in which business operated. Drawing on these deeper
normative commitments, Berle would make power the central category for
analysis of corporate religious exemptions.
We conclude by considering what lessons Berle’s corporate
conscience might yet hold for today. In doing so, we find an alternative
vision of corporate conscience missing in twenty-first-century scholarship

6. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 167 (1954) [hereinafter
BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION].
7. Id. at 182.
8. See id. at 182–83; ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 90–91 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY].
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and unearth a middle way in controversies over corporate religious
exemptions.
I. CORPORATIONS IN “THE CITY OF GOD”
“[T]he corporation, almost against its will, has been compelled to
assume in appreciable part the role of conscience-carrier of twentiethcentury . . . society,” Adolf Berle concluded in “Corporate Capitalism and
‘the City of God,’” the final chapter of The 20th Century Capitalist
Revolution.9 On Berle’s account, corporate managers could no longer
pretend that their activities were politically or morally neutral. For the first
time in their history, corporations had “reached a position” of power and
influence such that they needed a governing political philosophy.10 As we
show, Berle’s work indicates an affinity for the infusion of morality, and
arguably religion, into corporate life. He admired ethical managers and
hoped for them to take steps toward the good.
The idea that managers should stay in their narrow financial lane had
once been quite attractive to Berle.11 Indeed, The 20th Century Capitalist
Revolution is often described as a reversal of the position that Berle took
in his famous 1930s debate with E. Merrick Dodd.12 There, in a major
conceptual advance toward what we now call corporate social
responsibility, Dodd made the case that business corporations had a “social
service” function in addition to their economic function.13 He argued that
corporate managers held their powers in trust for the community and had
to make public-spirited decisions.14 At that time, Berle adhered to the more
traditional view that managers should stick to promoting shareholder
interests. Dodd’s claim that managers thought of themselves as public
servants was, Berle said, “theory, not practice.”15 No conservative
contractarian, Berle appreciated Dodd’s project, but thought that the
business world was not yet ready for its innovations.16 By 1954, however,
9. Id. at 182.
10. Id. at 166–67.
11. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1366–67 (1932).
12. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 134–35 (2008) (noting that The 20th
Century Capitalist Revolution represented an explicit reversal of his Berle-Dodd position but
explaining that by the time of the debate with Dodd, Berle already had moved away from his support
of shareholder primacy).
13. See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (1932).
14. Id. at 1160–61.
15. See Berle, supra note 11, at 1367.
16. See Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433,
443 (1962) (responding to Henry Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 399 (1962)); see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
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he admitted that “[t]he argument has been settled (at least for the time
being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”17
So, what had changed? To begin with, Berle had become convinced
that the purely private conception of the business corporation was
outmoded. When he surveyed the corporate landscape, Berle observed the
concentration of power in the hands of relatively few firms, which in turn
dominated different sectors of the economy.18 As a result, market prices
were no longer discovered through vigorous competition, as proponents of
the neoclassical model claimed,19 but were instead administered by
corporate managers.20 This concentration of power, Berle argued, justified
the study of corporations and corporate law through the lens of political
science.21 Managers wielded tremendous power over community affairs,
and any action they took would involve a political decision with an impact
on the community. Although society had grown accustomed to thinking of
corporations as neutral parties pursuing only material goods, corporate
neutrality was impossible.
Not only had the corporate world changed, but so too had corporate
law, Berle thought. As proof of concept, Berle pointed to the then-evolving
law of corporate philanthropy.22 An older view took corporations to be
prohibited from donating money to charities. The purpose of the for-profit
corporation was to make money for shareholders, and gifts to charitable
causes exceeded the authority of corporate fiduciaries. That view, Berle
claimed, had been definitively cast aside by the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s decision in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow.23 Relying on
Dodd’s 1932 article, the court wrote that “[d]evelopments since [Dodd]
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1932) (“It is conceivable—indeed it seems almost
essential if the corporate system is to survive,—that the ‘control’ of the great corporations should
develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the
community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather
than private cupidity.”); Harwell Wells, Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
77, 97 (2002) (citing ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).
17. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 169.
18. See id. at 25.
19. See F.A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE
PEOPLE 67–70 (1979).
20. See BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 39.
21. See id. at 5, 18, 32.
22. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 168–69 (citing A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)). The legacy of Barlow is contested. While its
sweeping language can be read as a full-throated endorsement of corporate social responsibility, the
opinion contains passages more supportive of the traditional shareholder primacy norm. A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) (Charitable giving “may likewise readily be justified
as being for the benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed strictly in
terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system.”).
23. 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
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wrote leave no doubts” that corporations could take on responsibilities for
public welfare through corporate philanthropy.24 Among these
developments were sustained state-corporate alliances during the
Depression and World War II, and the rise of public opinion in favor of
the corporation’s public responsibilities.25 Having once endorsed
shareholder primacy, Berle’s mature work warmly embraced a concept of
the corporation that transcended private profit and strived for social
responsibility.26
In The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, Berle argued that
although corporate managers might feel discomfort thinking in these
terms, they needed to draw on values deeper and more sustaining than
financial wealth. Indeed, he thought the best corporate leaders already
understood that they had a duty to manage corporations as “citizens of the
community,” not as immoral institutions.27 In Berle’s view, the boardroom
had to embrace ethical values—a philosophy of what constitutes “the good
life”—and make decisions accordingly.28 In this sense, he sought what one
of us has called a “moral marketplace.”29
So where would managers find their philosophy of the good life? In
Augustine’s The City of God, from which Berle drew his inspiration and
chapter title, the source of moral authority was clear.30 To live in the city
of God meant subordinating love of self to love of God. Berle remarked
that Augustine had offered “a striking and simple statement of a hypothesis
of political science.”31 All institutions needed “philosophical content” to
guide and sustain their affairs, even if that philosophical content operated
only in the background.32 On this analogy to the city of God, however,
corporations lacked a discernible faith.33 The business judgment rule
substantially shielded managers from accountability, leaving the only real
control to the “philosophy of the men who compose them.”34 “[T]he
community ha[d] not created any acknowledged referent of responsibility”

24. Barlow, 98 A.2d at 585.
25. See id. at 585–86.
26. See Wells, supra note 16, at 103.
27. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 167.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1613–15 (2013).
30. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans., Random House
2000) (426).
31. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 178.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 181 (“As yet the community has not created any acknowledged referent of
responsibility, no group from which they take their power mandate. . . . There is no recognized body
of doctrine by which they themselves must test their choice as they act from day to day.”).
34. Id. at 180.
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or “recognized body of doctrine” against which managers could test their
decisions.35
Nevertheless, the corporations once thought “soulless,” Berle
argued, had begun to manifest a consensus that acted “surprisingly like a
collective soul.”36 A higher law—he argued—was emerging in the
corporate field, a development that simultaneously held “splendor and
terror.”37 Managers would have to conform their decisions to a system of
higher values.
These remarks initially indicate that Berle would have been friendly
to the “faith at work” movement. In recent years, participants in this
movement have criticized the view that business is a secular matter and
have called for welcoming religion in the workplace.38 Much of the energy
behind this movement seems to come from the conviction that people
should be allowed to live fully integrated lives, drawing on their faith in
making everyday business decisions.39 Faith at work, the argument goes,
helps overcome the pernicious effects of corporate monoculture, providing
a more diverse and distinctive array of corporate communities. With his
concern over the growing power of corporations, not only over the
economy but also over the lives and personalities of the people who
worked in them, Berle might have been attracted to the idea of workplaces
animated by religious values.40
Certainly, the fact of religious businesspeople would not have
surprised him.41 Corporate power in Berle’s lifetime lay largely with
Protestant businessmen. Progressive Protestant circles and management
theorists advanced managerial philosophies of social service, drawn from
35. Id. at 181.
36. Id. at 183. Some of his contemporaries observed a similar shift. Carl Kaysen, for example,
noted that as management assumed community obligations, business corporations had become
“soulful.” Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311,
314 (1957).
37. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 182; see also id. at
69–70 (arguing that this inchoate law is emerging for managers).
38. See sources cited supra note 2.
39. See, e.g., ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, Introduction to AN EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO
FAITH IN THE WORKPLACE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHRISTIANS WHO OWN A BUSINESS (2016)
(“[W]hile some business owners are cheered and commended when they blend certain beliefs and
work, Christian business owners are often derided and denigrated, and sometimes face legal
challenges, when they do the same.”).
40. For additional sources on the faith at work movement, see Princeton University Faith &
Work Initiative, https://faithandwork.princeton.edu/ [https://perma.cc/EZ2P-DEYP]; HANDBOOK OF
FAITH AND SPIRITUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: EMERGING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (Judi Neal ed.,
2013).
41. For historical accounts of religion in corporate life, see the following contributions to this
symposium: Russell Powell, Spirit of the Corporation, 44 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 371 (2021); Joseph P.
Slaughter, The Virginia Company to Chick-fil-A: Christian Business in America, 1600–2000, 44
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 421 (2021).
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their faith.42 And beginning in the 1930s, conservative businesspeople
began to use religion to oppose the New Deal, itself supported by
adherents of the Social Gospel.43 Business lobbies and executives of some
of largest U.S. corporations joined cause with evangelical leaders to link
Christianity and free enterprise through advocacy and massively popular
advertising campaigns.44 While Berle, a staunch New Dealer, would have
opposed such efforts, he would have been aware of the religious
disposition of the corporate elite.
Berle’s own biography also seems to suggest a favorable disposition
toward corporate religion. The son of a Congregationalist minister, he
frequently claimed to elevate spiritual matters above material wealth.45
With Louis Brandeis as his model, Berle thought that it was folly to study
economics without attention to human values.46 One could not understand
economic life, he wrote, without recognizing that spiritual forces have a
profound influence on what people value and that corporations are merely
a tool for living full human lives.47
The “City of God,” moreover, suggests that Berle may have
embraced corporate religion for reasons of institutional pluralism. Like his
contemporary John Kenneth Galbraith, Berle looked favorably upon
institutional designs that provided countervailing forces to the problem of
concentrated power.48 He saw safety in numbers. In a consolidated modern
industrial economy, the existence of a plurality of corporations could
disperse the threat posed by any one economic institution.49 Attributing
42. See DARREN E. GREM, THE BLESSINGS OF BUSINESS: HOW CORPORATIONS SHAPED
CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 6 (2016) (“From as early as the 1930s, evangelical businessmen argued
for the freedom to run their enterprises as they wished, based in a managerial philosophy of executive
purpose, corporate responsibility, or social ‘service’ borrowed, in part, from more progressive
Protestant circles and management theorists.”).
43. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED
CHRISTIAN AMERICA 3–34 (2015); see also GREM, supra note 42, at 6.
44. See, e.g., KRUSE, supra note 43; BETHANY MORETON, TO SERVE GOD AND WAL-MART: THE
MAKING OF CHRISTIAN FREE ENTERPRISE 125–72 (2009); DARREN DOCHUK, FROM BIBLE BELT TO
SUNBELT: PLAIN-FOLK RELIGION, GRASSROOTS POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF EVANGELICAL
CONSERVATISM 51–76 (2011).
45. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN
ERA 89, 205–06 (1987).
46. See id. at 104.
47. Id.; see also id. at 89 (recounting Berle’s remark in a conversation with Brandeis that “life is
dominantly spiritual and not economic”).
48. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 6–7 (discussing Galbraith’s work);
see also BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 57 (noting American
suspicion of the concentration of power in great corporations and centralized government alike).
49. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 184 (describing as a
safeguard that “in America there are a few hundred powerful units, each of which has a limited
capacity to disagree with its fellow giants and to do something different . . . ”and no “central group
which proclaims orthodox doctrine”).
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social responsibilities to corporations would also avoid nationalization and
maintain a vibrant capitalist economy.50
Berle’s support for pluralism extended to definitions of the good life.
As corporations followed conscience, he said, “We have reason to hope
there will be enough disagreement so that the nuclei of power and of social
organization will not only agree, but differ as well.”51 Some corporate
managers might fund engineering and medical research, favoring a society
that prioritizes science over humanities.52 Others might advance the arts,
indicating a different vision of the city of God.53 Berle spoke
enthusiastically about the value of having a multiplicity of corporations
with managers holding an assortment of different opinions so that no
single opinion would dominate.54 Such institutional pluralism, Berle
thought, would protect individuals from domination by the concentrated
power of any one corporation.55 To the extent that religious businesses
have added a distinctive perspective to the corporate landscape today,
perhaps Berle would have applauded the resulting plurality of opinion.
In sum, Berle’s “City of God” indicates an openness to religion in
corporate life and an affinity for corporate conscience. This story,
however, is incomplete, as the next Part shows.
II. CONCEPTIONS OF “CORPORATE CONSCIENCE”
Berle had a distinctive vision of the conscientious corporation. As we
describe in Part A, “corporate conscience” in Berle’s usage represented
the public’s check on managerial discretion. In exercising their enormous
power over institutional resources, corporate managers owed significant
responsibilities to society. The public consensus would frame the scope of
acceptable corporate acts.
Contemporary uses of the term “corporate conscience” instead
downplay these social responsibilities in favor of the entity or individual,
as we explain in Part B. On one view, corporate conscience is a function
of an entity’s particular mission statement and organizational structure. On
another view, corporate conscience is an aggregation of individual
constituents’ conscientious commitments.

50. See id. at 165–66 (describing risks of nationalization); id. at 184–88 (expressing optimism
that social responsibilities could avoid those risks).
51. Id. at 185.
52. See id. at 176.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 185.
55. See id.; see also Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th
Century American Legal Thought, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 181–82 (2005) (discussing legal
pluralist views in Berle’s earlier work).
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We argue in Part C that as a realist and managerialist, Berle would
have found much to critique in both the entity and aggregate views of
conscience. More fundamentally, he would have rejected their focus on
individual integrity and self-preservation, because it sells short the public
interest and values at stake in corporate decisions.
A. Berle’s Conscience as Public Consensus
The central organizing idea in Berle’s account of corporate
conscience was “public consensus”—a widely shared set of values
adopted by the public.56 The public consensus provided the “frame of
surrounding conceptions which in time impose themselves” as constraints
on corporate managers.57 So how did the public consensus manifest as
corporate conscience?
To answer this question, we turn to an earlier chapter in The 20th
Century Capitalist Revolution, entitled “The Conscience of the King and
of the Corporation.”58 In these pages, Berle wrote of conscience as a
“higher law” that curbs the power of corporate managers and corrects for
its failures.59 That higher law, however, was “inchoate—there, but not
explicit, to be apprehended and worked out as you went along.”60 Over
time, Berle thought, the force of corporate conscience could “modify in
certain areas the absolute power of business discretion.”61
In elaborating this notion of conscience, Berle drew explicitly on the
historical distinction between law and equity. In running a corporation,
managers are entrusted with enormous discretionary power and only
loosely constrained by formal legal restrictions in their use of institutional
authority. As a consequence, they typically can choose from among many
strategic options without running afoul of the law. But formal legal rules
are not the only constraint on corporate managers. Equitable principles
also limit managerial power and discretion. For example, even if corporate
statutes and organizational documents would otherwise permit certain
managerial actions, courts may draw on deeper principles of corporate
accountability and legitimacy to police against entrenchment, self-dealing,
and other forms of opportunism.62

56. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 182–83.
57. Id. at 188.
58. Id. at 61–115.
59. Id. at 69.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 70.
62. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (“[I]nequitable
action does not become permissible simply because it is legal possible . . . .”).
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For Berle, corporate conscience similarly functioned as a higher
source of authority to hold management accountable.63 Managerial
discretion could be wide—indeed, the well-known efficiency benefits of
centralized management provided good reasons for this to be so. But it was
not unlimited. As he summed up, “we cannot grant either to government
or to private corporations the individual and arbitrary power thought
proper and necessary to the small private entrepreneurs of yesterday.”64
Even kings—at least if they were wise—made room for public appeals to
conscience.65 Like the leaders of political institutions subject to public
influence, corporate managers required an inchoate higher law to hem in
their power.66
In a major work published later in the decade, Power without
Property, Berle cemented this view of corporate conscience.67 In a section
entitled The “Public Consensus”—The “Corporate Conscience,” Berle
grounded his notion of conscience in the “value system of the
community.”68 The corporate conscience, he wrote, is “a set of ideas,
widely held by the community, and often by the organization itself and the
men who direct it, that certain uses of power are ‘wrong.’”69 To act with
integrity required aligning one’s behavior with the higher authority of
public consensus. That consensus was “the final arbiter of legitimacy—
both of the use of power and of the right of any individual or group to hold
it.”70 When corporate managers violate these social norms, Berle claimed,
they put at risk the entire system of private enterprise.
Reflecting his general comfort with spirituality, Berle entertained the
prospect that public consensus could coalesce around thinly religious
ideas. Modern statecraft of corporations depended, he said, on “a publicly
accepted body of philosophical premises derived from or through religion
or its equivalent.”71 This sort of thin religious consensus would seem to
track the common conception of a “civic religion”—a set of religious
commitments or attitudes that are generic or abstracted enough to bind a
people together.72 To fight against corporate tyranny, Berle thought that
corporate conscience—that is, the judgments of the community—had to
63. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 72–73.
64. Id. at 112.
65. Id. at 67.
66. Id. at 69 (giving as an example the Catholic Church’s doctrines and natural law as a check
on King Henry II).
67. See generally BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8.
68. Id. at 90–91.
69. Id. at 90.
70. Id. at 110.
71. A. A. Berle, Jr., Religion and Health in Modern Statecraft, 1 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 55, 60
(1961).
72. Id. at 62.
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penetrate the walls of corporations.73 For community judgments to operate
as they should, corporate conscience had to be “built into institutions so
that it can be invoked as a right by the individuals and interests subject to
the corporate power.”74 Corporate conscience needed keys to the C-suite.
One way to build conscience into a corporation was to have a “keeper
of conscience.” When a corporation fails to meet its obligations, that
failure affects the lives of real people. Those real people, in turn, must be
able to voice their objections to someone with institutional power. They
must be able to state the grounds on which they think the corporation has
violated their individual rights and interests. The keeper of corporate
conscience would meet that need, making sure that the claims of the
aggrieved did not fall on deaf ears.75 But if the corporation provided no
means or mechanism for individuals to protect their fundamental interests,
Berle predicted “revolt whose results are unforeseeable.”76
Indeed, one lesson Berle seemed to take from the Great Depression
was that when our social values deteriorate, so too will our economic
institutions. Writing in the 1930s, he said that laws, finance, and commerce
“are nothing save in the hands of men and women of vision, of courage,
of faith, proceeding from an inner spiritual strength and discipline.”77
Without a wide and inclusive public philosophy, economic institutions—
no less than political institutions—would perish.
Though it would draw on what he saw as timeless values, Berle’s
corporate conscience would also be dynamic. As society’s standards for
acceptable corporate behavior evolved, so too would corporate
conscience. It would be “in constant state of gradual development.”78
Corporate practices once regarded as appropriate might become morally
unacceptable. These social conventions would track society’s evolving
needs and standards.
B. Conscience in Contemporary Debates
Contemporary proponents of corporate religion employ the same
language of “corporate conscience,” but they locate that conscience in
different corporate mechanisms and stakeholders. For them, exercising
corporate conscience means adhering to values determined by private
individuals and associations. Whereas corporate conscience for Berle was
the voice of the public, today’s debates employ an inward-facing use of
73. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 114.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 76–77.
76. Id. at 114.
77. SCHWARZ, supra note 45, at 89.
78. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 110.
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the term. To act with integrity is to follow personal values even when they
do not match the public consensus. And if the state prevents religious
businesses from acting in accord with conscience, it puts those businesses
at risk of complicity with what they regard as evil.
With this background understanding, contemporary theorists
advance two opposing theories. An entity approach derives the conscience
of the corporation from internal governance structures and analogizes to
religious non-profits. An associational approach instead attributes
individual beliefs to the corporation and analogizes to voluntary
associations.79
On the entity account, a corporation has independent life,
personality, and conscience. Rather than being reducible to the acts of
individuals associated with it, “the corporation is a product of
organizational structures and purposes and is therefore an autonomous
being in its own right.”80 Walmart is Walmart, even as employees,
managers, and shareholders come and go. The corporation itself is the
bearer of rights to free exercise and conscience.
This account does not equate corporate conscience—and related
rights determinations—with the beliefs of any particular individual(s).
Instead, the overarching moral identity of an institution finds expression
through its mission statement, articles of incorporation, and ongoing
processes (such as budgeting and strategic planning). By harmonizing its
decisions with these aspects of corporate identity, an institution makes
moral judgments and strives to maintain its integrity like a human being.
Proponents of the entity view, in turn, say that forcing an entity to be
complicit in the projects of employees or customers that it perceives to be
wrongful undermines the central commitments of the institution.81
Requirements to provide contraceptive insurance coverage or to serve
same-sex weddings, for example, risk the very integrity of the institutional
actor. Entity theorists often point to non-profits as a model. Churches and
charities typically take the corporate form yet are considered standardbearers for free exercise rights claims. If a non-profit corporation can
exercise religion, why not a for-profit corporation? And in his opinion for
79. See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1447–55 (1987); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201, 205–11.
80. Nelson, supra note 29, at 1571–72.
81. See James D. Nelson, Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion of Symmetry, 102 VA. L. REV.
1969, 2008–09 (2016) (exploring the logic of complicity); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring
Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 727–30 (2014) (arguing that
under various ethical and religious traditions, to determine whether one has become complicit in
another’s wrongdoing, “[t]he necessity and proximity of one’s assistance to the wrongful act and the
seriousness of that act are balanced against one’s role and the gravity of one’s reason for
cooperation.”).
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the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Justice Alito found this
line of argument persuasive, remarking that “no conceivable definition of
the term [person] includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but
not for-profit corporations.”82
On the associational account, by contrast, the corporation is a means
by which individuals come together to express their collective moral
judgments.83 In a business corporation, this means that people voluntarily
join a common enterprise that reflects their moral values. The corporate
entity, on this view, is a misleading reification that distracts focus from the
individual members of the corporation.
This account takes a traditional definition of conscience as a
phenomenon closely related to an individual’s moral integrity or sense of
self.84 Conscience represents a process whereby individuals identify moral
principles, assess context, and determine how to act. Acting according to
conscience has real importance less because it is about being (morally or
politically) right than because it is central to being a whole person.
Although individuals disagree over right and wrong, each person has an
interest in self-authorship—the ability to act consistent with deep
religious, moral, and ethical commitments constitutive of their identity.85
To act against conscience, theorists agree, threatens “a psychological
schism that violates the integrity of the person as a unity of body, soul, and
psyche.”86
This associational conception of corporate conscience invites the
question: Whose conscience counts for the corporate form? Answers have
varied. Some have argued that it should consider the interests of various
corporate constituencies, including shareholders, managers, employees,
and customers.87 Thus far, however, driven in no small part by the type of
corporations from which claims have come, courts have drawn moral
beliefs of the corporation from its shareholders.88 Some have emphasized
82. 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014).
83. See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1540–45 (2012)
(criticizing this view as not describing conscience at all but arguing that it may usefully describe the
societal value attached to the phrase “institutional conscience”).
84. See Nelson, supra note 81, at 2005–09; Sepper, supra note 83, at 1526–32; see also Cécile
Laborde, Religion in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34 L. & PHIL. 581, 596–99 (2015);
Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 352–54 (2011).
85. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 52 (2008).
86. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious
Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 240 (2002).
87. See Nelson, supra note 29, at 1586–1610.
88. For a more comprehensive list of cases brought by for-profit businesses, see HHS Case
Database: For-Profit, BECKET, https://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/hhs-info-central/hhscase-database/?fwp_database_profit=d45359f6b46b548f0f4b64a61cfe828f [https://perma.cc/S6KCWPUA].
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the freedom that corporate law affords shareholders to craft corporate
charters and bylaws in accordance with their own religious
commitments.89 Others have argued that shareholder conscience deserves
special attention because their responsibility for corporate decisions makes
them especially vulnerable to harms of complicity.90
C. A Fundamental Disconnect
Today’s claims of corporate conscience—whether they sound in
corporate moral agency or in personal identity—do not channel society’s
demands through corporate managers. Instead, they leverage claims of
institutional and individual freedom. Berle would have rejected each of
these contemporary conceptions of corporate conscience.
Let’s begin with the real entity view of corporate conscience. Berle
would have had little sympathy for the notion of an emergent group
personality that exists independent of the individuals who compose the
group.91 To the extent that an institution could be said to have a conscience,
and he believed it could, Berle took the position that it had to operate
through specific individuals who provided a process by which the public
could plead their case.92 He instructed his readers that in studying the
corporation, “one must not forget that the organization itself is composed
of men.”93
Likewise, he would have rejected the formalism of looking to
corporate documents and mission statements rather than to the interests of
real human beings who interact through the corporate form. “Paper
organization”—as he put it—might often reflect the enterprise (or goals)
of the people in a corporation, but it did not inevitably do so.94 The reality
of enterprise administration and the relationships people have with the
firm should govern, not its documents or legal form.
Berle also would have been skeptical of the analogy between
business corporations and nonprofits. At the time he wrote, a “fiscal
triangle” separated the state, the economy, and civil society into distinct

89. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory
of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014).
90. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of
RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173 (2015).
91. Berle’s pragmatism is evident throughout his writing. See, e.g, BERLE, POWER WITHOUT
PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 14 (“[T]he best thing we can do is to understand the business we do have,
to know the results we want from it, and to do our best to 16assure that these results are produced.”).
On pragmatist and legal realist opposition to group ontology more generally, see James D. Nelson,
Some Realism about Corporate Crime, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (2020).
92. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 61–115.
93. Id. at 187.
94. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 344 (1947).
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sectors.95 The government’s role was to regulate—an ever-present risk if
business did not conform to social expectations. The for-profit sector
would produce. Non-profit entities, separate both from government and
revenue generation, would advance educational and philanthropic goals.96
Importantly, during Berle’s lifetime, non-profit corporations were
considered “institutions for carrying out public tasks”—not the vehicles
for private individual rights they subsequently became.97 Although their
numbers were rapidly increasing, they were still fairly constrained in their
purposes, with universities, foundations, and art and cultural institutions
serving as the exemplars.98 With authorization from the state, there had
emerged a symbiotic relationship between the non-profit and for-profit—
with businesses offering financial support and nonprofits reciprocating
with knowledge and advice on the novel obligations of the corporation.99
For Berle and his contemporaries, business corporations and charitable
organizations played different social roles.100
Ironically, Berle himself repeatedly deployed analogies involving the
business corporation and the medieval Church. On an initial read, his uses
of an analogy to the Church seem conflicting. Sometimes, corporations
played the role of early city-states locked in a struggle with “the Church,”
represented in Berle’s account by the political state.101 At others,
corporations had compiled authority “comparable to the religious power
in the mediaeval church.”102 In both instances, however, Berle used the
Church as a marker for concentrated power. As the political state became
an economic state, it competed for influence with corporations. As
corporations consolidated power, they became, like the Church, lawmaking and law-applying entities that affected a wide array of individuals
95. Jonathan Levy, From Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise of the Nonprofit
Corporation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 213, 213 (Naomi R. Lamoureux &
William J. Novak eds., 2017).
96. Id. at 215.
97. Id. at 216.
98. Id. at 229. From 1940 to 1970, with the liberalization of granting nonprofit charters, the
number of nonprofits rose from 12,500 to 309,000. Id. The examples Berle gives of corporate social
enterprise—Princeton University, the United Negro College Fund, American College in Beirut, and
artistic enterprises—track these categories. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION,
supra note 6, at 175–76.
99. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 169 (“[T]he state has
authorized corporations to withhold from their shareholders a portion of their profits, channeling it to
schools, colleges, hospitals, research, and other good causes.”).
100. Id. at 168 (describing donations to “non-governmental philanthropic and educational
institutions which have played so stately a role in the development of twentieth-century America.”).
101. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Organization of the Law of Corporation Finance, 9 TENN. L. REV.
125, 144–45 (1931) (“The corporation struggles today with the government as in older days political
governments struggled with the Catholic Church.”).
102. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 352; see also Schwarz, supra note 45, at 56 (“The
corporations were becoming the absolutists the church had been centuries before.”).
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and weakened the political state. Although Berle claimed to admire the
Catholic Church of the Middle Ages,103 his writing was constant in
assigning the Church the role of totalitarian. He would not have found
analogies between church and business to support corporate conscience.
By contrast to the real entity view, the associational view of
corporate conscience likely would have held some appeal to Berle. In
Corporate Capitalism and the ‘City of God,’ Berle repeatedly discussed
the individual people whose decisions structure the firms’ engagement on
issues of moral significance.104 By his lights, the associational view would
carry the advantage of recognizing these individuals.
But he would have thought that it too fell far short of describing the
modern corporation. Scholars like Berle gravitated toward a pragmatic
view of the firm, focused on its social facts and purposes rather than its
ontology.105 Early in Berle’s career, John Dewey’s 1926 article had
essentially put an end to the fever-pitch debate over corporate
personality.106 And in 1932, Berle and Means described large corporations
as “the organized activity of vast bodies of individuals, workers,
consumers and suppliers of capital under the leadership of the dictators of
industry, ‘control.’”107 Corporations, in their view, were no mere
association of people or arrangement of private contract, but comparable
to a nation state.108
Moreover, Berle would have been flummoxed to find that
contemporary accounts of corporate conscience locate conscientious
beliefs in shareholders. Berle saw little involvement of the shareholder in
firm decisions.109 The publicly traded corporations that were the focus of
his lifetime of work involved large numbers of distant shareholders and
granted managers power over shareholder money with little
accountability. His early work with Gardiner Means is best known for
showing the degree to which shareholder investments had been separated

103. See Schwarz, supra note 45, at 206 (explaining that Berle was quite taken with the Middle
Ages, applauding them for their “social harmony, discipline, and spiritualism, all of which were
enhanced by a strong Church”).
104. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 186–87.
105. Levy, supra note 95, at 223 (“What replaced natural theories of corporate personality in the
United States was a more pragmatic, less philosophical and abstract notion of corporate personhood.”).
106. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655, 672–73 (1926). See Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 479 (2004) (“By 1930 the dialogue had largely run its course, with the general
consensus being that a corporation was an important legal form which was more than a mere
contractual aggregation but which could not truly be equated with a natural person.”).
107. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 349.
108. Tsuk, supra note 55, at 193–94.
109. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 39.
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from the professionalized management of industrial firms.110 For Berle,
this separation of ownership and control meant that the “capitalist” had all
but vanished from the picture of capitalism—his capital remained, but he
was “no longer a decisive force.”111
Berle saw shareholders as apathetic, passive, and detached.112 In later
work, he anticipated what is now known as the “separation of ownership
from ownership,” which refers to the rise of institutional investors as
intermediaries between ordinary investors and public companies.113 With
this shift, ordinary investors were “completely separated in fact and almost
equally separated in law from any connection with the corporation.”114 In
their place were “an unrecognized group of professional administrators
distributing the fruits of the American industrial system, directing its
present activities, and selecting the path of its future growth.”115
As a result, Berle would be unconvinced that corporate rights—
including religious liberty rights—traced to individual shareholders. We
think it likely that he would have sided with the group of corporate law
professors who argue that shareholders and corporations are
fundamentally separate entities for purposes of religious exercise.116 For
Berle, the attenuated connection of shareholder to corporation signaled the
lack of spiritual and expressive value in stock ownership. Whereas the
owner of a horse—Berle and Means wrote—was responsible for his horse,
the owner of shares of stock had no such responsibility toward the firm.
“[T]he spiritual values that formerly went with ownership” no longer
existed, they concluded.117 Ownership of shares did “not express an
individual.”118

110. Tsuk, supra note 55, at 180 (“[I]n the collective imagination of corporate law scholars, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, which remains one of the most cited works in recent
decades, is remembered not as the book that called attention to corporate power, but as the book that
called attention to the separation of ownership from control in large public corporations.”).
111. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 39.
112. Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1965).
113. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground—Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J.
CORP. L. 1, 6–7 (2007) (discussing the “separation of ownership from ownership”).
114. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 18.
115. Id.
116. See Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354 and 13-356);
Brief for Corporate Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
117. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 66, 68.
118. Jerome Christensen, Neo-Corporate Star-Making: The Band Wagon and the Charismatic
Margin, 20 L. & LIT. 213, 215 (2008) (quoting Adolf A. Berle, Jr., in WILBUR HUGH FERRY, THE
ECONOMY UNDER LAW (1960)).
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To the extent corporate conscience derived from any participant in
the firm, Berle would have insisted that moral values flowed through
corporate managers. After all, it was the managers who were in charge of
making day-to-day decisions, and it would be their sense of right and
wrong that would channel or constrain corporate behavior.119 In this way,
Berle reflects the “heroic managerialism” that came to prominence over
the course of his career.120 As Lynn Stout has explored, at mid-century
managers sought to act as faithful servants to their employees, customers,
and nation as well as their investors.121 Corporate executives and theorists
of the corporation carried Berle’s managerialist views into the 1970s.122
A contemporary proponent of corporate conscience might concede
this point with regard to public companies, but nonetheless argue that
closely held corporations advance shareholder conscience. These firms by
definition involve a smaller number of investors and far less passive
investment. Moreover, in these businesses, the distinction between
shareholder ownership and managerial control tends to collapse. The
controlling shareholders of Hobby Lobby, for example, are also officers
and directors of the firm.123 As a result, Berle’s preoccupation with
shareholder separation, and the corresponding attenuation of their moral
relationship with the firm, might diminish in the context of close
corporations.
Nevertheless, the individualized nature of Hobby Lobby’s corporate
conscience represents a stark contrast with the public orientation of Berle’s
corporate conscience. The source of conscientious objection in that case—
like the many others that were litigated alongside it—were the personal
identities of the controlling shareholders. On the question of whose
119. Id.
120. Gregory Mark, The Corporate Economy: Ideologies of Regulation and Antitrust, 19202000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 613, 635–44 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). See also Alfred D. Chandler, The United States: Seedbed of
Managerial Capitalism, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE
OF THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 35 (Alfred D. Chandler & Herman Daems eds., 1980)
(showing that by the 1950s, “managerial capitalism had triumphed”); A. A. Berle, Jr., Foreword, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix, xiii (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959) (“The principles and
practice of big business in 1959 seem to me considerably more responsible, more perceptive, and (in
plain English) more honest than they were in 1929.”).
121. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2013).
122. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
397, 403–05 (2015) (summarizing executive views); Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as
Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 315–16 (2015); see generally Harwell Wells,
“Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation
Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305 (2013) (exploring the ubiquity
of managerial views and its effect on corporate law theory and practice).
123. On the law of close corporations, see generally DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO,
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS (2019).
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conscience mattered, the Court focused exclusively on the religious beliefs
of the Green family.124 And their objections to facilitating contraceptive
coverage for their employees were not made in the name of “public
consensus”—indeed, the right they claimed was to be exempt from the
public’s judgment that employees were entitled to cost-free coverage of
such preventive healthcare services.125
Berle also seems to have held a dim view of controlling
shareholders—a common feature of close corporations. When ownership
was dispersed in public companies, he thought it more likely that corporate
managers would “pay greater attention to the unwritten, uncrystallized, but
very real, standards set up by the public consensus than do the holders of
undisputed control.”126 By contrast, controlling shareholders were apt to
be consumed by their own interests and plans.127 They would—and
could—overlook the opinion of the broader community. For Berle, this
was no conscience at all.
In sum, Berle’s corporate conscience assumed an external
orientation. The inchoate rules of behavior came from the broader public
and told corporate managers something about how they must behave
toward others. They had to look beyond their interests and those of their
shareholders to serve the wider society.
Today’s theories of corporate conscience instead take an inward turn.
They either look to the corporation’s own (sometimes non-public)
governing documents and arrangements or seek to advance the individual
interests of controlling shareholders. A dramatically narrower set of
corporate interests prevails over the public.
III. THE QUESTION OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
Despite his obvious sympathies for bringing ethical, moral, and
religious values into corporate governance, Berle would not have
embraced religious exemptions for corporations. To begin with, he would
have been generally skeptical of exemptions that affirm or augment
corporate power over individual freedom. As Section A describes, for
Berle, escalating corporate power called for enhanced duties to the public,
not increased autonomy for corporations to act as they pleased. The
campaign for corporate religious liberty, which Section B briefly sketches,
would have caught him by surprise. He understood the law to be trending
toward recognizing constitutional responsibilities, not rights, for large
corporations.
124. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 720–26 (2014).
125. See id. at 704.
126. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 109–10.
127. Id.
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So how might Berle have approached the economic and legal
arguments for exemption? Section C argues that his lifelong preoccupation
with power would have led him to worry about exemptions that strengthen
corporations at the expense of vulnerable constituencies. He would have
been attentive to the dynamics of corporate power in markets for labor,
products and services, and beyond.
A. Berle’s Preoccupation with Power
A constant throughout Berle’s work was a preoccupation with
corporate power. Concentration of industrial control in the hands of
corporate managers raised persistent worries for a democratic political
economy. Managers could leverage that control to dominate vulnerable
members of society, including employees, customers, and the
communities in which those businesses operated. They wielded
particularly totalizing authority in internal relations over employees. Berle
was convinced that this corporate power had to be tamed, whether it was
through the force of public consensus—his corporate conscience—or the
force of the law.128
So what was the nature of this corporate power? Berle offered a
strikingly simple definition: Power “is capacity to induce or require action
by others in certain areas of activity.”129 Corporate power could manifest
in two distinct ways. First, corporate managers had authority over those
within the firm—that is, over corporate employees.130 Second, by virtue of
their size, wealth, technological capacities, and lack of market
competition, corporations held significant sway over the broader society
and might overtake the democratic state.131 Influenced by John Kenneth
Galbraith’s work, Berle thought that both forms of corporate power posed
a threat to the freedom and wellbeing of ordinary individuals that called
for accountability.132
To maintain the legitimacy of the modern corporate system, states
would need to protect various constituencies from these threats of
corporate abuse.133 Gone was Adam Smith’s world of small entrepreneurs
competing in highly competitive markets. In its place was a corporate
world populated by small groups of men with effective control of the
128. See BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 61–115; see
also Elizabeth Sepper & James D. Nelson, The Religious Conversion of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 71 EMORY L.J. 217 (2021).
129. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 32.
130. See id.
131. See SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 207 (1996).
132. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 25, 47.
133. See Sepper & Nelson, supra note 128.
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largest companies in the economy.134 Rather than forces of production
moving in response to fluctuating prices, Berle saw corporate managers—
or what Alfred Chandler would call “visible hands”—running the show.135
The old methods that regulated small businesses in competitive markets
would need to be reconsidered.136 On Berle’s view, the state could serve
as an ally of individuals seeking to hold back coercive corporate authority.
Once the state took the lead in protecting vulnerable constituencies,
Berle thought that corporations could follow in its footsteps. Through
democratic lawmaking, the state could identify the public priorities that
corporations were to advance. And in turn corporations would cooperate
with the state and direct their power toward not only economic wellbeing
but also wider social and political goals.137
Berle thus did not resist all uses of corporate power. From his
experiences during the Great Depression and its aftermath, Berle knew full
well the terrors that accompanied an uncoordinated market. Big
corporations, in his view, were here to stay—and society needed to make
the best use of them. His approach deemed corporate power permissible
so long as it was deployed in service of economic coordination.138 But use
of corporate power beyond its legitimate scope—for example, to dominate
individual personality or to engage in invidious discrimination—was
beyond the pale.139
As one important check on illegitimate uses of power, Berle argued
for legal and quasi-legal limitations on corporations. In his view, just as it
was necessary to limit the arbitrary power of states over their citizens, it
was also wise—at least in some circumstances—to limit the arbitrary
power of corporations over their constituencies.140 In The 20th Century
Capitalist Revolution, Berle argued, for example, that corporate
employees were entitled to adequate justifications for any employment
“interruption,” and that those justifications had to appeal to a “legitimate
public purpose.”141 In doing so, he challenged the social foundations of atwill employment, claiming that the economic conditions for such a

134. See Thomas K. McCraw, Review, The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Adolf
A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, 18 REVS. IN AM. HISTORY 578, 590 (1990).
135. See ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
136. See McCraw, supra note 134, at 582.
137. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 115–16 (1963).
138. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 98–110 (discussing the concept
of “legitimacy”).
139. See id. at 98–110; BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at
61–115.
140. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 81–86.
141. Id. at 100.
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doctrine had long passed.142 Through growth and concentration of
industry, corporations had “invaded the political sphere,” taking on the
role of “quasi-governing agency” in their employment relationships.143
In earlier work as well, Berle contended that the dependence of
individuals on corporations had to be paired with the ability to assert
certain rights against them. Those rights included not only due process in
employment, but also “equal protection of the laws” and a host of other
constitutional constraints.144 Like some of his scholarly contemporaries,
Berle thought he saw a “quiet translation of constitutional law” to protect
“individuals in their dealings with private units wielding great economic
power.”145 He even cited with approval the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision
in Marsh v. Alabama, which he thought came within a “biscuit-toss” of
directly applying constitutional due process requirements to private
corporations.146
At the time he wrote, Berle likely could not have imagined corporate
claims for religious liberty. To be sure, the history of corporate
constitutional rights goes back to the nineteenth century.147 But in 1954,
the types of corporate rights that were recognized by the Supreme Court
bore a close relation to corporate property.148 Two decades would pass
before the Supreme Court embraced corporate liberty rights, including the
right of free speech.149
142. Id. at 103.
143. Id. at 105.
144. See Adolf A. Berle, Constitutional Limits on Corporate Activity: Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942–43 (1952) [hereinafter
Berle, Constitutional Limits]; Adolf A. Berle, The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 643 (1952) (describing the firm as “an arm of the state, held to certain of the
limitations imposed on the state itself by the Bill of Rights requiring the concentrate to respect certain
individual rights and to assure a measure of equal protection of the laws within the scope of its
power”).
145. Berle, Constitutional Limits, supra note 144, at 942.
146. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 105. For
contemporary work arguing that Marsh v. Alabama should be revived to contain the authority of social
media conglomerates, see Genevieve Lakier & Nelson Tebbe, After the “Great Deplatforming”:
Reconsidering the Shape of the First Amendment, LPE BLOG (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/after-the-great-deplatforming-reconsidering-the-shape-of-the-firstamendment/ [https://perma.cc/QKK4-ZR6U].
147. See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES
WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View
of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 245 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
148. See Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoureux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment,
in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 286 (Naomi R. Lamoureux & William J. Novak eds.,
2017).
149. Berle died in 1971, five years before the seeds of modern corporate rights were planted.
Albin Krebs, Adolf A. Berle Jr. Dies at Age of 76, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1971),
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/19/archives/adolf-a-berle-jr-dies-at-age-of-76-lawyer-economist-
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Nor was there a well-developed mandatory religious exemption
regime in U.S. constitutional law.150 No doubt Berle was familiar with
permissive religious exemptions—legislative accommodations for
churches and religious institutions were common at the time. Most
notably, Title VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed
religious employers to favor their co-religionists in employment
decisions.151 But he would have seen these efforts as particular to the social
function of religious non-profit organizations and largely outside the realm
of constitutional adjudication. Exemptions for business corporations on
the basis of religious liberty were virtually nonexistent. Like the Supreme
Court, Berle would likely have thought “patently frivolous” the argument
that for-profit businesses could assert religious objections to the federal
civil rights act.152
B. Contemporary Claims for Corporate Religious Exemption
Given the time in which he studied corporations, Berle simply could
not have foreseen the twenty-first century campaign for corporate religious
exemptions. Although in the past business corporations had claimed free
exercise rights on rare occasion,153 beginning in 2013 hundreds of
corporations filed suit in response to the requirement that their employees’
health insurance coverage include contraceptives. Because the law only
applied to large employers with fifty or more full-time employees, the
businesses were not mom-and-pop shops. Instead, Hobby Lobby, a craft
chain with $3 billion in annual revenue, became the standard bearer and
named plaintiff when the issue reached the Supreme Court.154
Proponents of these corporate religious exemptions leaned heavily
on a libertarian vision. In a line of argument sounding in the Lochnerian
premises of a century ago, courts, litigants, and scholars described
employers and employees as equals in bargaining over the conditions of
employment.155 The state, they claimed, burdened religious exercise by
seeking to change the terms of that bargain and to bar the business from
contracting consistent with its faith. Whereas the market preserved liberty
liberal-leader.html [https://perma.cc/MCT9-VSA2]. See, e.g., Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
150. Sherbert v. Verner, considered the origin of the exemption regime in place before
Employment Division v. Smith, was decided in 1963. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1 (a).
152. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 403 n.5 (1968).
153. See, e.g., infra cases cited in n.157.
154. Scott Wilson, What You Need to Know About the Hobby Lobby Billionaires, ABC NEWS
(June 30, 2014), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/06/what-you-need-to-know-about-thehobby-lobby-billionaires [https://perma.cc/AGS3-JHXE].
155. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (2015).
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and served as the natural baseline, business regulation instead infringed on
free exercise and sought to redistribute—unjustly in the claimants’ view—
from the market. The government, exemption proponents said, need not
take from business to give to employees or customers. It could achieve its
goals by letting the market work, whether to facilitate employees’ access
to contraceptives or same-sex couples’ purchases of wedding cakes. On
this view, economic activity is determined by the voluntary actions of
individuals, and competition among private businesses ensures that these
private relationships do not become coercive.156
Before the contraceptive mandate litigation, employers—religiously
affiliated or not—lost these suits for judicial religious exemptions from
employment and consumer protection laws under both the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.157 Courts
rebuffed infrequent claims from for-profit corporations.158
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court moved to
grant business corporations a right to free exercise.159 It first found that
for-profit corporations were “persons” under RFRA and were therefore
eligible for religious exemptions under the statute.160 It then held that the
contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the companies’ sincere
exercise of religion and did so in a manner that was not narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling government interest.161 Having found that the
mandate failed strict scrutiny as applied to certain closely held companies,
the Court concluded that the law must cede to their religious liberty
claims.162
Four years later, a retail business also successfully advanced a free
exercise claim—this time under the Constitution—against a state law
requiring nondiscrimination toward patrons. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a bakery challenged the application of
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, arguing that it forced the business to
156. See id.
157 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (social security); Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (federal wage requirements); Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (state sales and use taxes); United States
v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2000) (unemployment insurance); Victory
Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 442 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (workers’
compensation); St. John’s Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1992)
(workers’ compensation).
158. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); State by McClure v.
Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985); E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co.,
859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
159. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
160. See id. at 705–09.
161. See id. at 719–35.
162. See id. at 736.
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participate in same-sex weddings in violation of its owner’s sincere
religious beliefs. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled for the bakery, finding
that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated its right to free
exercise under the First Amendment.163
In the wake of Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop, business
corporations have mounted constitutional arguments against several
employment and consumer protection laws. Wedding vendors have scored
recent successes, winning exemptions from public accommodations laws
that might require them to serve customers equally.164 Some employers
now argue that Title VII’s protections against discrimination should not
cover their employees.165 Others contend that they must be exempted from
covering a variety of health services to which they object.166
Across these claims, corporations advance a political economy that
describes the state as a growing threat to private moral and market
ordering. They paint the Affordable Care Act, for example, as a product
of extraordinary governmental overreach.167 Long-standing public
accommodations antidiscrimination laws newly intrude upon business
liberty. Democratic decision-making, on this account, is more likely to
overreach into associational life than to protect those within it.168
Corporate power, from this perspective, serves as a welcome constraint on
the state. It ensures alternative spheres of authority and existence that can
protect plural communities from the dangers of state-imposed
orthodoxy.169
163. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
164. See, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush & Nib
Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2019).
165. Harris Funeral Homes was successful on its RFRA claim in the district court, see EEOC v.
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841–42 (E.D. Mich. 2016), but that
decision was reversed by the Sixth Circuit, see 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), and the company did not
seek review of that RFRA holding in its certiorari petition. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (“Harris
Funeral Homes did unsuccessfully pursue a RFRA-based defense in the proceedings below. In its
certiorari petition, however, the company declined to seek review of that adverse decision, and no
other religious liberty claim is now before us.”).
166. Order for Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Kelley v. Azar, No. 4:20-cv-00283-O, 2021
WL 4025804 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2021) (involving employers and individual health insurance
purchasers who object to covering preventive services including PrEP drugs); Franciscan All., Inc. v.
Azar, 414 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (concluding that healthcare providers and insurers must
be exempted from sex nondiscrimination rule related to providing gender affirming care to transgender
people).
167. See Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated,
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 28–29 (2014) (describing economic libertarian ethos of the religious liberty
claims).
168. See Robin West, Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the
Social Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 399 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad
Flanders & Zoe Robinson eds., 2016) (summarizing corporate religion claims).
169. See Sepper & Nelson, supra note 128.
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C. Corporate Religious Exercise Structured by Corporate Power
How might Berle evaluate today’s claims of corporate religious
exemption? Here, we argue that his approach would have been built
around the analytical category of power and its effects on individual
personality. Drawing on his deeper normative commitments and political
economy, Berle would have been attracted to the idea that facts about
economic power should be central in analyzing claims for corporate
religious exemptions.
Berle’s views on corporate exemption claims, then, would have
likely resembled the Supreme Court’s pre-Hobby Lobby analysis of
religious exemptions in commerce. In employment in particular, the Court
had taken a realist view of power imbalances between employer and
employee and emphasized the risk of abuse.170 In earlier decisions, it saw
a business’s entry into the marketplace as a choice. As the Supreme Court
said in United States v. Lee, “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter
into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on
their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that
activity.”171 Other precedent instructed that the regulation of commerce
did not burden free exercise in a constitutionally significant way insofar
as it simply made “the practice of … religious beliefs more expensive.”172
From this point of view, business religious exemptions were not neutral,
but rather required a subsidy from the state (and/or third parties) to
objectors.

170. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 292, 300–03 (1985) (coming
to this conclusion despite undisputed evidence that “associates” saw their work as a “ministry”).
171. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Donovan v.
Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1983), aff’d sub nom. Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 294 (1985) (“By entering the economic arena and trafficking
in the marketplace, the foundation has subjected itself to the standards Congress has prescribed for the
benefit of employees.”); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Ak. 1994)
(noting that “the economic burden, or ‘Hobson’s choice,’ of which [the landlord] complains, is caused
by his choice to enter into a commercial activity that is regulated by anti-discrimination laws.”); Smith
v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Com., 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 1170 (1996) (landlord objecting to antidiscrimination
laws can “avoid the conflict, without threatening her livelihood, by selling her units and redeploying
the capital in other investments”).
172. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–07 (1961) (“[I]t cannot be expected, much less
required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic
disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various
religions.”); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 391
(1990) (“[T]o the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of
money appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not constitutionally
significant.”); Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 694–700 (1989) (disallowing
tax exemption for religious “auditing” sessions reduced objectors’ income, but did not burden religious
activity).
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Likewise, Berle would have been unimpressed by blanket claims that
competitive markets will resolve the harms generated by exempting
businesses. He was well-versed in the ideas of laissez-faire economists.173
And near the end of his career, he feared that the reemergence of this style
of thinking would lead society to forget the hard-earned lessons of the
Depression and the New Deal.174 From close study of corporations and
capital markets over decades, Berle knew that markets did not function as
the neoclassical economists insisted. Market concentration and corporate
power were simple facts about the world—facts that anybody concerned
with the interests of real people could not ignore.
To the degree that corporate religious exemption claims rest on the
idea of the free market as a natural and neutral baseline, Berle would have
soundly rejected such claims.175 Berle thought that we should not, and
could not, divorce economic study of business from deliberation about
moral values. The purported value neutrality of neoclassical economics
was to him a sham that masked its own ideology.176 Removing the
neoclassical mask, however, need not be frightening—it could be
empowering. Berle wrote, “If we have lost the nineteenth-century comfort
of thinking that the voice of the open market is regnant and is the voice of
God, we have at least gained the twentieth-century comfort of believing
that inadequacies and inequities can be remedied, and that we know where
to go to get relief.”177
Now, given his focus on concentration, perhaps Berle would have
been more supportive of the contraceptive challengers because they were
closely held, rather than public corporations. Berle spent the bulk of his
time writing about public companies. Because of their size, public
corporations were assumed to have power to impact both people inside the
firm and broader society, power that called for restraining. These public
companies might seem a far cry from the closely held family businesses
involved in the contraceptive mandate litigation.
Nevertheless, Berle was not oblivious to power relationships in
closely held corporations. Family businesses, for example, present their
own issues of domination. As Benjamin Means has noted, the hierarchical
173. See Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433
(1962) (responding to Henry Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 399 (1962)).
174. See id. at 433 (“Professor Manne and his contemporaries did not live through World War I
and the decade of the twenties, and the crash of 1929, culminating in the breakdown of the American
economic system in 1933. They have not experienced a corporate and financial world without the
safeguards of the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .”).
175. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 85–86 (rejecting classical
assumption that markets are natural and always beneficial).
176. See id. at 21.
177. Id. at 87.

2021]

Corporate Conscience

125

norms of family are often reproduced within the corporate form.178 Those
who traditionally lack power within the family often become minority
shareholders, without the power to replace company managers or to sell
their shares for fair value.
Moreover, Berle likely would have rejected any corporate claims to
exemption from worker protections. These claims tend to adopt the
assumption that corporate employment is voluntary, that workers consent
to the terms of their compensation, and that they are free to leave if they
don’t like their bargain. But Berle knew that internal authority relations—
that is, those that exist within firms—can be at least as coercive as external
relationships found in the wider marketplace. Indeed, he thought that the
notions of hierarchy and authority embedded in employment contracts
posed distinctive threats to employee personality and wellbeing. And so,
he would have seen little appeal in exempting employers that refuse to
contribute to social security, pay fair wages, or cover employee health
needs to advance their own religious beliefs. The power they wielded over
their workers required taming.
By contrast, Berle’s preoccupation with power and concentrated
markets suggests that he might have favored small retail stores like
Masterpiece. Their objections might be distinguished from workplacerelated objections on two grounds. They tend to involve truly small
businesses, sometimes individual proprietorships. And they do not involve
the internal relation of employer to employee, but rather the external
relation of retailer to customer. Both of these distinctions would have
carried significance for Berle.
Although Berle was not smitten with small businesses, a distinction
between small, private businesses and large, public corporations runs
throughout his work. In The American Economic Republic, he wrote, most
economic activity is carried out by “nonstatist enterprise, commonly called
‘private.’”179 But Berle doubted that the giant corporations of his age could
legitimately be thought private. Their numbers of shareholders,
consumers, and employees transformed them into “institutions of public
account and responsibility.”180 By contrast, he wrote, “[a]n individually
owned retail shop or farm or small plant is undoubtedly ‘private.’”181
As always, power was the unifying concept for the distinction. In
Berle’s view, businesses drew much of their power from economic
178. Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185,
1209–10 (2013) (“To the extent the social roles are incompatible, family business has a built-in
conflict.”).
179. BERLE, supra note 137, at 115.
180. Id. at 116.
181. Id. at 115.
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concentration.182 From his perspective, small businesses usually did not
“attain a power-position capable of invading personality.”183 Thus, he
opined, “[t]he corporation operating the single store would not have power
sufficient to affect seriously the life of any individual. On the other hand,
if substantially all these stores were controlled by the same corporation,
the power would be obvious.”184
This analysis suggests that Berle might have been tempted by the
Amicus Brief for Law and Economics Scholars submitted in Masterpiece
Cakeshop.185 The brief acknowledged that in concentrated markets with
coordinated discrimination against consumers, the law may need to police
against discrimination. But the brief also argued that in the absence of
consolidation and coordination, market forces would ensure that same-sex
couples had full access to goods and services to celebrate their marriages
notwithstanding religious objectors. Under this approach, a bakery in rural
Alabama might have to serve a same-sex couple, while those in the
thriving lower Manhattan market would be free to discriminate. Given
competition and the absence of employer-employee authority relations,
Berle too might have been less concerned about these instances of
discrimination.
Fundamentally, however, Berle’s view of the political economy
would have led him to part ways with proponents of exemptions for
corporations of any size. As we have explored in other writing, Berle was
centrally committed to the primacy of state leadership in economic
matters.186 By following public consensus, business corporations might
escape direct governmental regulation. But it was for the political state to
decide. A real threat of state regulation was necessary to right the power
imbalances between corporation and community, employer and employee.
Corporate power—not democracy—was the hovering threat to freedom
inside and out of associations.

182. See Berle, Constitutional Limits, supra note 144, at, 952 (“If there are fifty stores in the
vicinity from which an individual can satisfy his needs, discriminatory practice by any one of them
has little or no effect on the individual.”).
183. Id. at 946. For a modern take, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW
EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 1–36 (2017) (arguing that
market freedom used to function in the interests of liberty and equality, but industrialization changed
the economic world, such that economic power became concentrated, and the principles of a “free
market” became oppressive).
184. Berle, Constitutional Limits, supra note 144, at 953. For an exploration of the ways in which
public accommodations—including a single retail store—exercise power over customers, see
Elizabeth Sepper, The ‘Unique Evils’ of Public Accommodations Discrimination, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 271 (2020).
185. See Brief for Law and Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
186. Sepper & Nelson, supra note 128.
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And so, while Berle likely would have treated the regulation of small
retailers as less pressing, he would not have wanted courts to inhibit the
state from advancing public consensus on equality. Property devoted to
commercial or productive—as opposed to personal—use had rightly, in
Berle’s view, been subject to state and federal statutes requiring
nondiscriminatory service.187 These statutes, he explained, reflected “the
political ideal invested in the Constitution” that individual “personality
was not to be invaded.”188 He cited Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and state public accommodations laws as examples of the wider realm of
appropriate regulation.189 Unlike the Law and Economics Scholars in
Masterpiece, Berle saw discriminatory denial of service as an affront to
personality and equal protection.190 The state had to oversee businesses
open to the public, especially in aggregate, lest people be left “at the mercy
of blind open-market results.”191
Berle’s account thus assumed a functional political process that
determined the ultimate result for corporate regulation. His vision of
industrial democracy did not make room for judges second-guessing
legislative compromises over business regulation. As part of these
compromises, legislatures might choose to exempt small retailers at some
cost to would-be consumers. But where authority relations existed as
between employers and employees, corporate power had to be checked.
Corporate First Amendment rights throw this vision into disarray.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary debates over corporate religious exemptions seem
locked into a binary conception of corporate conscience. It is either a
product of a particular organization’s mission and structure, or else it
springs from the deep personal commitments of its individual participants.
Each view foregrounds private moral ordering and submerges public
obligations.
Adolf Berle’s corporate conscience provides a third way. His
enduring insight is that corporate managers make decisions that are
political to their core, even if dressed up in the technical language of
financial economics. On his view, corporate conscience put the public’s
187. Berle, supra note 112, at 9 (noting that legislation represented “an evolving social concept
of what American civilization should look like” and rightly limited management discretion).
188. Id. at 10–11.
189. Id. at 12.
190. Berle, Constitutional Limits, supra note 144, at 951–52.
191. BERLE, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC, supra note 137, at 116; see also BERLE, POWER
WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 13 (noting bad behavior by small businesses and that “it was
absurd for liberals to swallow the fiction that all virtue lay in smallness, and that all vice inhered in
size”).
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voice in the C-suite, with decision-makers who might otherwise be
insulated from its expectations and demands subject to a social standard
of public consensus.
Various social developments since Berle’s time call into question the
very idea of a public consensus—especially one coalescing, as he
suggested, around a thin set of mainline Protestant views. Today, religious
pluralism has exploded in the United States, including the rise of the
“nones,” who identify as atheist, agnostic, or otherwise religiously
unaffiliated.192 At the same time, political polarization among the
American electorate has increased dramatically. The social organizations
that once gave voice to low- and middle-income populations have all but
vanished.193 And the “great exception” of postwar prosperity no longer
holds in the extreme inequality of our new Gilded Age.194
Nevertheless, if we see corporate conscience as Berle did, as a social
standard against which corporations can be measured, we might begin to
identify mechanisms to insert the public into the soul of the corporation.195
As Berle wrote, “[i]n creating, maintaining, and expanding [public]
consensus all of us have a part. It is a sort of continuing election in which
there are no nonvoters.”196 Although the passage of time may alter the
“public consensus” in fundamental ways, the present generation remains
free to reconstitute and shape our economic system.197 If public consensus
forms—perhaps around wildly popular initiatives like economic stimulus,
worker relief, and corporate transparency—then Berle’s corporate
conscience may still hold insights for corporate law, regulatory, and
constitutional reforms. Likewise, we might begin to transform debates
192. Pew Rsch. Ctr., America’s Changing Religious Landscape (May 12, 2015),
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
[https://perma.cc/6G8B-6DV6].
193. See Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and
Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546 (2021).
194. Historian Jefferson Cowie writes, “The postwar era, the period of the ‘great exception’ in
action, was an extraordinarily good time to be a worker.” JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION:
THE NEW DEAL AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 153 (2017). Berle saw the political economy
as trending in the direction of giving all Americans enough wealth “by which the opportunity to
develop individuality becomes fully actualized.” Berle, supra note 112, at 17.
195. See, e.g., Danielle D’Onfro, Corporate Stewardship, 44 J. CORP. L. 439, 443 (2019)
(proposing that corporations have stewards who bear oversight and reporting duties “to protect the
public interest by looking after the internal workings of their employers”); Veronica Root Martinez,
More Meaningful Ethics, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 62 (2020) (arguing that firms should adopt
“specific and explicit ethical infrastructures within their compliance programs” and explaining the
contours of such mechanisms). For discussion of more potential reforms, see Sepper & Nelson, supra
note 128.
196. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 26.
197. See Sanjukta Paul, On Socializing the Constitution of Economic Coordination, LPE BLOG
(June
29,
2020),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/on-socializing-the-constitution-of-economiccoordination/ [https://perma.cc/G8F9-HWAC].
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about corporate rights into ones about corporate responsibilities to the
public in ways that inform new efforts to forge—as Berle once aspired to
do—a constitutional “economic republic” to regulate America’s corporate
actors.198
Just as Berle offers a third conception of corporate conscience, his
frame of power also offers a fresh approach to debates over corporate
religious exemption. His analysis structures itself around concentrated
market power and authority relations. From this perspective, where there
is competition and a lack of coordinated discrimination, perhaps retail
businesses can be treated as relatively powerless and exempted from duties
of nondiscrimination. There will be dignitary costs but without, in Berle’s
view, the power that so concerned him. By contrast, employers and other
actors on the power side of an authority relationship (perhaps, for example,
hospitals) could not claim a right to dominate those on the other side.
Instead, Berle would say, constitutional interpretation should recognize
their responsibilities and constrain them from intruding on individual
personality.
Perhaps more than anything, Berle would caution any contemporary
readers not to take his own conclusions as gospel. This caution would not
come from a deep sense of humility—a quality Berle sorely lacked.199
Instead, Berle thought that our approach to corporations had to take
account of current social conditions. Any reforms had to be keyed to the
actual social problems of a given time. He would not have been drawn to
arguments that start with the inherent nature of corporate personality or
with the historical origins of the corporate form.200 Corporations like any
social institution, he would have reminded us, are embedded within
particular historical contexts. And while historical arguments might be
illuminating, ultimately, to borrow from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “the
present has a right to govern itself so far as it can.”201

198. BERLE, supra note 137, at 100.
199. See SCHWARZ, supra note 45, at 114–17 (discussing Berle’s arrogance).
200. See, e.g., David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the
Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013) (discussing the corporation’s “provenance”).
201. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learning and Science, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139; see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 787, 807 (1989) (discussing the realist view that law is “a functional instrument meant to meet
present and future human needs”).

